"Woman - Symbol Of Devi"

    

    In Shaktism, as against Vaishnavism, woman is seen as the embodiment of Devi, at least ideally. The tendency in this tradition is monistic, theism being only a steppingstone to the mystical experience. Further, sadhana here is individualistic, the goal being to intuit one’s union with the divine, the spin-off of its attainment being the experience of personal autonomy in social relationships."" Thus, the introduction of the Sankardevite neo-Vaishnavism in Assam, in opposition to the prevailing Shakti-worship, can be considered a dilution of the healthy individualism of Assamese culture, since the former is more group-oriented as compared to Shaktism, as we have seen above. The new ideology can also be assumed to have generated considerable conflict within the culture as regards the status of women; one example is that, quite possibly due to the neo-Vaishnavite brand of Sanskritization, Assamese women (though freer than other Indian women) still have to cover their heads with their saree-ends in the presence of adult males, as is the practice elsewhere in India except for the South.

    Also, with the coming of the proselytizing neoVaishnavite ideology, the Hinduization of the liberal, tribal sub-cultures became more pronounced, and many tribal people took sharan, i.e. they became initiated into the Sankardevite cult. These groups became comparatively puritanized as a consequence, and they were absorbed at the lower, socially less influential end of the caste hierarchy.

    Over the centuries, this neo-Vaishnavite ideology has gradually become the official one, and we have seen above that it is comparatively more puritanical than the traditional world-view, especially since the former is held by the uppercaste groups. This process is now being accelerated, since the attitudes of these upper-caste elites are increasingly falling in line with those of the pan-Indian official culture, with the improvement in communications with the rest of the country. Thus, these Assamese elites are now gradually coming to share the general values of the pan-Indian elites: they emphasize the less intellectual, less sophisticated and more activist and philistine aspects of the Hindu parampara, e.g. the Bhagawad Gita. Ipso facto, they also venerate Gandhi and Vivekananda, who were the most successful purveyors of the “Hindu Renaissance” brand of the Hindu tradition, spurious though it is in Sapir’s terms. These traditionalienated elites are either not aware of, or consciously ignore, the traditional distinction between smriti and shruti: the Gita, for example, is really only a smriti and thus has only semi-canonical status, and, therefore, is hardly as authoritative within the tradition as it is deceptively made out to be.

    With the greater political domination of the modem Assamese society by the upper-caste elites, and thus with their increasing control of the official machinery, the Sankardevite/neo-Vaishnavite ideology can be expected to become universal in Assam, though the Bodo and other tribal groups are already resisting what they call “Assamese chauvinism”. The process of puritanization of Assamese culture can also be expected to accelerate even further, in view of the fact that the pressures of economic modernization are becoming increasingly felt. The patriarchization of Assamese culture will thus become increasingly salient, just as in the case of the matrilineal Nayars of Kerala during this century. There are already disturbing straws in the wind, as when agitating political groups try to ban the usual joyous celebration of the Spring Bihu festival, in order to further their own factional ends. Of course, the ad nauseam, stereotypical glorification of Sankardev and his neo-Vaishnavite movement has itself considerable political overtones; it helps to fill a neonationalistic need, since the reformer Sankardev is considered to be the fountain-head of the distinctive, subnationalistic Assamese identity.

    Before sum up argument, it may be interesting here to also have a look at the relative geographical spread of the official ideology. It would seem that in Upper Assam, where there are other powerful lower-caste Hindu groups like the Ahoms, and also substantial tribal populations, the hold of the official, Sankardevite ideology is considerably weaker. Another reason for this could of course also be that Upper Assam is further away from the Bengal region, from where the reformist wind of Chaitanya’s neoVaishnavism blew into Assam. Thus, the Bihu spring-festival of communal song-and-dance has basically been a social phenomenon of Upper Assam, in parts of which the merrymaking at this time of the year goes on for as long as a whole month. All this would seem to indicate indirectly that, in terms of female autonomy and so on, the situation is not so bad in Upper Assam, possibly also because Shaktism is still a very strong cultural undercurrent there. 

    To conclude, the official Assamese ideology, which is Sankardevite/neo-Vaishnavite, is more puritancial as compared to the traditional Shakta sub-stratum of the culture, which latter by its matrifocal nature is quite liberal in every sense. And this official ideology has of late become even more puritanical, with the accelerating pan-Indian pressures of modernization, and the resultant “technological moralizing” and blandishment.